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AGGLOMERATION AND AID 
 
 
Abstract 
 
A key issue in development economics is the explanation of core-periphery patterns around 
the world. Combining this issue with that of analyzing unilateral transfers (e.g. foreign aid) 
points in the direction of the use of New Economic Geography (NEG) models which, so far, 
has not been done explicitly. This paper tries to fill this gap in the literature by studying the 
(possibly ‘catastrophic’) effects of aid around the so-called break-points and sustain-points in 
a NEG model. We also analyze the effects of a “bystander”, that is a country which is not 
directly involved in the transfer. In the traditional transfer literature a bystander is known to 
potentially cause transfer paradoxes. Our findings in this NEG setting are as follows. First, 
direct transfer paradoxes are not possible in a symmetric setting even if a bystander is present. 
Second, the effects of foreign aid depend on the level of economic integration between donor 
and recipient. Third, if the equilibrium from which aid is given is stable, aid only has a 
temporary effect (even if there is a bystander present). Fourth, if the donor is relatively large, 
not only the recipient but also the bystander benefits from foreign aid. 
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1. Introduction 
The theory of international transfers has a long and interesting history. Without doubt 
the most famous discussion on this topic was the exchange in The Economic Journal 
between Keynes an Ohlin in 1929. But much earlier other well-known economists 
like Hume, Smith, Ricardo, and Mill had already discussed the effects of international 
transfers. The early debates mostly revolved around war reparation payments in which 
the analysis of terms-of-trade effects or exchange rate effects dominated, see Brakman 
and Van Marrewijk (1998, 2007).  
 
After the Keynes-Ohlin debate the focus of the modern literature on transfers, 
however, soon moved to the welfare effects of a transfer. By means of a simple 
example Leontief (1936) raised the possibility of transfer paradoxes (in which the 
donor gains and/or the recipient loses from the transfer). The main point of reference 
on this matter has been (and continues to be) Samuelson's (1947) assertion that 
Leontief's example requires unstable markets. More specifically, in a perfectly 
competitive, Walrasian stable, two-country world with two traded goods the donor's 
welfare falls and the recipient's welfare rises, see also Kemp (1964) and Mundell 
(1960). Samuelson's result, in general, does not hold if productive resources are 
transferred instead of purchasing power, if distortions are present in the system, if aid 
is tied, or if there are more than two countries. Transfer paradoxes are thus quite 
possible in more general settings, see e.g. Jones (1967, 1985), Ohyama (1974), Gale 
(1974), Chichilnisky (1980), Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta (1983), Kemp and Kojima 
(1985), Schweinberger (1990), Kemp (1995), van Marrewijk and Michael (1998), 
Djajic, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (1999), Lahiri et al. (2002), Kemp and 
Shimomura (2003), and Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2004).1 
 
Given the recent surge in research in international economics on core-periphery 
structures, as initiated by the New Economic Geography (NEG) a.k.a. Geographical 
Economics literature, it is remarkable that an explicit analysis of aid in a such a core-
periphery context is lacking. This is also remarkable because Krugman (1993, 1995) 
partly found his inspiration for NEG in development economics! With some 
exaggeration one might say that the largest problem in development economics is the 
                                                 
1 See Brakman and Van Marrewijk (1998) for a survey of the transfer literature. 
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persistence of global core-periphery patterns. In this chapter we address this gap in the 
literature and deal explicitly with aid or transfers in the context of a NEG model.2 We 
find that transfer paradoxes are not possible under symmetry (even when a bystander 
is present), that the effects of aid are usually only temporary (given stability of the 
equilibria from which aid is donated), and that the bystander might benefit from aid 
even if it is not explicitly targeted by the transfer of foreign aid. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the basic model and 
apply it to the study of aid in a two-country setting. Different from most NEG models 
we also analyze a three-country model in section 3. This is the smallest model that 
allows for a donor, a recipient and a bystander. In section 4 we evaluate our findings. 
 
2. Analyses of aid and agglomeration: the two-country case 
2.1 The model 
For our purposes the core model of NEG, as developed by Krugman (1991) and 
subsequently analyzed in depth by Fujita et al. (1999), suffices for our analysis. 
Although other useful NEG models have been introduced after Krugman (1991), this 
first model is essentially the same as later NEG versions (see Robert-Nicoud, 2004). 
Here, we present only the equilibrium equations of this model. For a short derivation 
of the model the reader can consult Appendix I.  
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2 The only study that addresses regional transfers is Baldwin et al. (2003). They, however, have a 
different focus than we do as they analyze the effect of subsidies on the home market effect, and 
conclude, that “the region that has the larger income or the region that is subsidized has an 
equilibrium share of industrial firms that is larger than its share of income or its relative subsidy. 
These biases are magnified by high levels of openness” (p. 454). Then they proceed by analyzing 
political issues to determine “the equilibrium size and direction of subsidies”(p.454). 
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Equation (1) indicates that income in country i, consists of two parts. Income in the 
manufacturing sector, LWii δλ , where W is nominal wage rate, Lδ  is the share of 
the total labor forced employed in manufacturing, of which a share iλ  is employed in 
country i. Income in the numéraire sector is Li )1( δφ − , where iφ is the share of the 
immobile labor force in country i. The parameter ε stands for the elasticity of 
substitution between manufacturing varieties. In the remainder of the paper we use the 
symmetry assumption that 2/1=iφ  in the two-country case and 3/1=iφ in the 
three-country case.  
 
Equation (2) is the exact price-index associated with the CES aggregator in the utility 
function with regard to manufactures. This is standard in the Dixit-Stiglitz framework 
we use (see Appendix I). Equation (3) is in essence the market equilibrium equation 
that reflects that demand equals (break-even) supply. rsT  are the standard ice-berg 
transportation costs between countries r and s (the number of units that have to be 
shipped to ensure that one unit arrives). Equation (4), finally, defines the real wage 
rate that drives migration flows (and the associated redistribution of economic 
activity) in the model. Migration is determined by real wage differences. If the real 
wage in a country is higher than in another country, this country will attract footloose 
labor. It is important to note that this introduces two equilibrium concepts in the 
model. Equation (3) always holds, and reflects equality between demand and supply 
on the goods market (short-run equilibrium). This does not necessarily imply that real 
wages are equalized between countries. If real wages are equalized, through 
migration, there is no longer an incentive to migrate. This is why the latter 
equilibrium is known as the long-run equilibrium.  
 
Aid can now relatively easily be introduced by simply subtracting aid, A , from the 
donor’s income, and adding it to the recipient’s income. Without loss of generality we 
always take country 1 to be the donor and country 2 to be the recipient. We do not 
analyze the effects of taxes explicitly. So, who pays for the foreign aid? Implicitly we 
make one of two assumptions.  
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 All countries pay the same tax, and subsequently the proceeds are re-distributed to 
the recipient. This tax system reflects inter-country regional subsidies, or aid 
redistributed through a multi-national institution like the World Bank.   
 Only the immobile labor force has to pay taxes. Such a system does not affect the 
decisions made by the footloose sector, which is central in NEG models. For these 
reasons we do not include the tax rate explicitly, as it would not change the essence of 
any of our conclusions and only clutter the analysis with an additional parameter. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, we apply this model to analyze the effects of aid, or 
in more neutral terms the effects of international or interregional transfers. First, we 
present the two-country case, and subsequently the three-country case in section 3. 
 
2.2 Aid in the 2-country core model of geographical economics 
Given the equations (1)-(4), we have the following set-up of the two-country case in 
which aid is present:  
(5) AWY −−+= 2/)1(111 δδλ   AWY +−+= 2/)1(222 δλδ  
(6) [ ] )1/(111221111 εεεε λλ −−−− += TWWI  [ ] )1/(112211112 εεεε λλ −−−− += WTWI  
(7) [ ] εεεε /112121111 −−− += ITYIYW   [ ] εεεε /112211112 −−− += IYITYW  
(8) δ−= 111 IWw     δ−= 222 IWw  
  
Equation (5) reflects the transfer from the donor to the recipient, the other equations 
are the two-country versions of (2)-(4). First, we investigate the marginal impact of 
foreign aid A, given by country 1 to country 2, around the spreading equilibrium 
( 5.021 == λλ ) evaluated at 0=A . In this set-up the spreading equilibrium in which 
the countries are identical in all respects is always a long-run equilibrium. Note, that 
at this spreading equilibrium equations (1)-(3) hold for the following endogenous 
variables: 121 ==WW ,  5.021 == YY , and [ ] )1/(1121 2/)1( εε −−+== TII .  
 
We like to find out how a transfer affects this equilibrium. Following a similar 
procedure as developed by Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) to determine the 
breakpoint; we want to investigate changes in the spreading equilibrium if an 
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infinitesimal transfer A is made from country 1 to country 2.3 We will ignore all 
second order effects of induced changes, such that we can write 21 dYdYdY −== , 
21 dWdWdW −== , and similarly for the other variables. Differentiating equation (5) 
and evaluating at the spreading equilibrium gives equation (9). Similarly, differentiate 
equation (6) and evaluate at the spreading equilibrium to get equation (10). 
(9) dAdWdY −= )2/(δ  
(10) ( )dWTI
I
dI
2
1 11 εε −− −=  
 
To facilitate notation it is convenient to define )1/()1( 11 εε −− +−≡ TTZ . Note, that Z is 
an index of trade barriers which ranges from 0 when there are no transport costs (T = 
1) to 1 when transport costs are prohibitive ( ∞→T ). With this notation we can 
rewrite equation (10) at the spreading equilibrium as equation (11). Finally, using this 
notation, differentiating equations (7) and (8) and evaluating at the spreading 
equilibrium gives equations (12) and (13). 
(11) ZdW
I
dI =  
(12) 
I
dIZdYZdW )1(2 −+= εε  
(13) 
I
dIdWdwI δδ −=  
 
System (11)-(13) gives us all the necessary information to calculate nominal wage 
changes (11) and (12) and then real wage changes (13). Substituting equations (9) and 
(11) in equation (12) and collecting terms gives equation (14), expressing nominal 
wage changes in terms of parameters. Substituting (14) in (9) gives (15), and shows 
that the income level in country 1 falls and in country 2 rises. Combining (11) and 
(14) gives the change of the price index following a transfer; the price index in 
country 1 falls and rises in country 2 (see equation 16). Using equations (11) and (13) 
we can nonetheless conclude, despite this price index effect, that the real wage rate in 
country 1 falls and in country 2 rises, see equation (17). 
                                                 
3 For the validity of this procedure see Baldwin (2001) and Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2006). 
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We summarize these findings in proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1 
The impact effects of an infinitesimal income transfer in the spreading equilibrium of 
the 2-country core model of geographical economics are: 
 an increase in the wage rate for the recipient and a decrease of the wage rate for 
the donor (eq. 14). 
 an increase in the income level for the recipient and a decrease of the income 
level for the donor (eq. 15). 
 an increase in the price index level for the recipient and a decrease in the price 
index level for the donor (eq. 16) 
 an increase in the real wage rate for the recipient and a decrease in the real wage 
rate for the donor (eq. 17) 
 
In contrast to most models in standard international transfer theory, see Brakman and 
van Marrewijk (1998), the core model of geographical economics is well suited to 
analyze the dynamic implications of foreign aid. Most of this dynamics is based on 
the simple, ad hoc assumption of a redistribution of manufacturing workers from 
countries with low real wages to countries with high real wages, see equation (18). 
This is not only substantiated by extensive empirical literature, but can also be 
grounded in evolutionary game theory, see Weibull (1995), or justified in an 
endogenous growth framework, see Baldwin and Forslid (2000). Furthermore, 
Baldwin (2001) shows that this simple equation is consistent with forward looking 
behaviour. We restrict attention to the standard dynamics as given in equation (18), 
where η  indicates the speed of adjustment and w  is the average real wage rate.  
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Using a procedure similar to that used above to derive equations (14)-(17), Fujita, 
Krugman, and Venables (1999) show that the spreading equilibrium is locally stable 
if, and only if, the no-black-hole condition holds ( δρ > ) and if the transport costs are 
large enough, more specifically if condition (19) holds.4  
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This puts us in a position to determine the dynamics of foreign aid around the 
spreading equilibrium. First, write the relative real wage 21 / ww  as a function, f  say, 
of the distribution of the manufacturing workforce 1λ  and the amount of foreign aid 
A , conditional, of course, on the parameters of the model: ),(/ 121 Afww λ= . If 
condition (19) holds, we know that 0)0,5.0(' <λf . Combining this with Proposition 1 
(which established that 0)0,5.0(' <Af ) and the dynamics of equation (14) shows that 
the transfer of foreign aid around the spreading equilibrium leads to a reduction of 
manufacturing activity for the donor and an increase for the recipient.  
 
Figure 1 The dynamic impact of foreign aid (intermediate transport costs) 
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4 The parameter ρ is the is the so called love-of-variety parameter associated with the Dixit-Stiglitz 
model underlying our NEG model, see Appendix I. The relationship between the elasticity of 
substitution ε and this parameter is that )1/(1 ρε −≡ . 
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Figure 1 illustrates the discussion above for  the case of intermediate transport costs 
( 7.1=T ). The figure depicts the real wage in country 1 relative to country 2 for all 
possible short-run equilibria (distributions of manufacturing workers). If the real wage 
in country 1 is higher than in country 2 workers will migrate from country 2 to 
country 1, and vice versa if the real wage is lower in country 1 than in country 2. As a 
consequence, there are three stable long-run equilibria in Figure 1, namely the 
spreading equilibrium and complete agglomeration in either country 1 or country 2. 
As a result of the transfer of foreign aid, the real wage falls for the donor and rises for 
the recipient around the spreading equilibrium, as can be seen by the downward shift 
of the short-run relative real wage curve, which causes an outflow of manufacturing 
activity from the donor to the recipient. There are two other cases to consider as well, 
see Brakman, Garretsen, and van Marrewijk (2001) for details. If transport costs are 
large, the spreading equilibrium is the only stable equilibrium and we arrive at a 
similar (local) conclusion as for the case of intermediate transport costs. If transport 
costs are small, however, the spreading equilibrium is unstable and the transfer of 
foreign aid leads to complete agglomeration of manufacturing activity in the recipient. 
Proposition 2 summarizes our discussion.  
 
Proposition 2 
The dynamic effect of an infinitesimal transfer of aid in the spreading equilibrium of 
the 2-country core model of geographical economics is: 
 a small influx of manufacturing activity for the recipient and a small reduction for 
the donor if the spreading equilibrium is locally stable. 
 complete agglomeration of manufacturing activity in the recipient if the spreading 
equilibrium is locally unstable. 
 
We are now in a position to discuss the extent to which foreign aid has temporary or  
permanent effects on agglomeration. First, look at Figure 1. The transfer of foreign 
aid shifts the short-run relative real wage curve down causing an increase of 
manufacturing activity for the recipient and a decrease for the donor. It is important to 
note that the downward shift, and therefore the impact on the distribution of 
manufacturing activity, only continues as long as country 1 continues to give foreign 
aid to country 2. Once country 1 ceases to provide foreign aid, the short-run relative 
real wage curve shifts back to its old position and the effect on the distribution of 
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manufacturing activity is reversed. In this situation, the effects of the transfer of 
foreign aid are only temporary and conditional on the continuation of the flow of 
foreign aid. The situation is quite different in Figure 2, where the transfer of foreign 
aid also leads to a downward shift of the short-run relative real wage curve, which 
causes complete agglomeration of manufacturing activity in the recipient country.  
 
Figure 2 The dynamic impact of foreign aid (low transport costs) 
Relative real wage, with and without foreign aid
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Again, once country 1 seizes to transfer foreign aid to country 2 the short-run relative 
real wage curve shifts back to its old position. This time, however, the consequences 
of the initial transfer are permanent as agglomeration in country 2 continues to be a 
stable equilibrium. Proposition 3 summarizes our discussion.  
 
Proposition 3 
The dynamic effects of an infinitesimal transfer of foreign aid in the spreading 
equilibrium of the 2-country core model of geographical economics are temporary if 
the spreading equilibrium is locally stable (i.e. stopping the flow of foreign aid 
reverses the economy to its original position). These dynamic effects are permanent if 
the spreading equilibrium is locally unstable (i.e. stopping the flow of foreign aid 
does not reverse the economy to its original position). 
 
In practice, propositions 2 and 3 imply that the consequences of aid are fundamentally 
different depending on the level of integration between donor and recipient. If 
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economic integration is high, that is if the level of transportation costs is low, aid can 
have dramatic, lasting effects on the distribution of economic activity. On the other 
hand, if the level of economic integration is low, that is transportation costs are high, 
the effects of foreign aid are temporary and the distribution of economic activity is 
only affected as long as the foreign aid flow continues. Empirical research indicates 
that even for the EU regions, which a priori presents an example of an highly 
integrated economy, the ‘extent of agglomeration forces’ is still quite small, 
indicating that the  likelihood of only temporary effects of interregional transfers is 
high (Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm, 2006). 
 
2.2 Complete agglomeration 
In section 2.1 we studied the consequences of aid in the spreading equilibrium. What 
happens if the donor and the recipient are not equal in size? The standard motivation 
for aid is a welfare difference between donor and recipient, where the donor is rich 
and the recipient is poor. In the NEG literature a limiting case is complete 
agglomeration: all footloose production takes place in the donor country (here, 
country 1). So, doing the analysis of aid in a NEG setting with complete 
agglomeration might be more relevant than taking the spreading equilibrium as our 
focal point. Equations (5)-(8) are again the starting point for our investigation. First, 
note that complete agglomeration in country 1 implies 11 =λ  and 02 =λ . Using this 
information in equations (5)-(8) shows that they are solved for the following values of 
the endogenous variables: 1111 === wIW , AY −+= ]2/)1[(1 δ , AY +−= ]2/)1[(2 δ , 
and TI =2 . The impact effects of a transfer are therefore straightforward. 
 
Proposition 4 
The impact effects of a transfer of aid in the agglomeration equilibrium of the 2-
country core model of geographical economics are: 
 no change in the wage rate of manufacturing workers or the price index for the 
donor 
 an increase in the income level for the recipient and a decrease of the income 
level for the donor 
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Since there are no manufacturing workers in the recipient it is not really appropriate to 
talk of their wage rate 2W , but we can calculate what this wage rate would have been 
by using equation (7), see equation (20). Similarly, we can calculate the implied real 
wage rate 2w  by using equation (8), see equation (21).  
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Noting that the real wage rate for mobile workers is equal to one in the donor country, 
it follows that it will be attractive for mobile workers to relocate from the donor 
country to the recipient once the implied real wage 2w  is larger than one. If that 
occurs, complete agglomeration of manufacturing activity in the donor country is no 
longer sustainable. Since this is equivalent to requiring ε2w  larger than one, we can 
define the auxiliary function ε2),( wATg ≡  as given in equation (22).  
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(iii) 10),(' )()( >>−= +−− TifTTATg A εδρεδρ  
 
The main properties of function ),( ATg  are listed below equation (22). We note that 
its value is one if there are no transport costs ( 1=T ), it is declining for sufficiently 
small transport costs and aid flows (as 0),1(' <Ag T  provided ρρδ 2/)1( +<A ), and 
its value is above one for sufficiently large transport costs (provided δρ > , the so-
called no-black-hole condition). As illustrated in Figure 3, the agglomeration 
equilibrium is sustainable for sufficiently small transport costs (for T  below a critical 
value such that 1),( <ATg ), but not for sufficiently large transport costs.  
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Figure 3 Sustain point with and without foreign aid 
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The impact of the transfer of foreign from the agglomeration or core to the periphery 
on the sustain point is also illustrated in Figure 3, see also (22.iii). The flow of foreign 
aid increases the income level in the periphery, which makes it more attractive as a 
base for production. This shifts the ),( ATg  curve upwards as 0),(' >ATg A  for 1>T , 
leading to a shift to the left of the critical sustain point value, and thus to a smaller 
range of transport costs for which agglomeration of manufacturing activity is a 
sustainable equilibrium. Our findings are summarized in Propositions 5 and 6. 
 
Proposition 5 
The dynamic effect of a transfer of foreign aid in the agglomeration equilibrium of the 
2-country core model of geographical economics is: 
 no reallocation of manufacturing activity from core to periphery for sufficiently 
small foreign aid flows 
 a large reallocation of manufacturing activity from a core-periphery setting to an 
(asymmetric) spreading equilibrium or complete agglomeration in the recipient 
once the foreign aid flow exceeds a critical level 
 
Proposition 6 
If the transfer of foreign aid in the agglomeration equilibrium of the 2-country core 
model of geographical economics has a dynamic effect, then this effect is permanent 
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(i.e. stopping the flow of foreign aid does not reverse the economy to its original 
position). More specifically, stopping the foreign aid flow will either lead to the 
spreading equilibrium (if the aid-induced economy is in its basin of attraction) or to 
complete agglomeration in the recipient country.  
 
3.  The effects of a bystander: foreign aid in the 3-country model 
The analysis of international transfers benefited enormously from examples that 
aimed to show under what circumstances transfer paradoxes might arise (see Brakman 
and Van Marrewijk, 1998, for a survey and discussion of these examples). Although 
not without some problems, the examples pointed out that if a bystander is present a 
transfer paradox might arise (the donor gains and/or the recipient looses from a 
transfer).5 A general derivation was given by Bhagwati, et al. (1983), who explicitly 
show that the presence of a bystander, which must actively be involved in 
international trade, is essential for paradoxes to arrive. A paradox may arise if the 
bystander’s offer curve is inelastic (backward-bending) or if the bystander’s export 
good is an inferior good for either the recipient or the donor. We therefore extend our 
analysis to include a third party, or ‘bystander’ that is not directly involved in the 
initial transfer. The set-up of this model is a straightforward extension of the two-
country case analysed above.6 
(5’) AWY −−+= 3/)1(111 δδλ    
AWY +−+= 3/)1(222 δλδ  
 3/)1(333 δλδ −+= WY  
(6’) [ ] )1/(1113311221111 εεεεεε λλλ −−−−−− ++= TWTWWI   
[ ] )1/(1113312211112 εεεεεε λλλ −−−−−− ++= TWWTWI  
[ ] )1/(1133112211113 εεεεεε λλλ −−−−−− ++= WTWTWI  
(7’) [ ] εεεεεε /1131312121111 −−−−− ++= ITYITYIYW  
[ ] εεεεεε /1131312211112 −−−−− ++= ITYIYITYW  
                                                 
5 The reason for such paradoxes is that a transfer from country 1 to 2, affects the terms of trade. 
Because the bystander is also involved in international trade with countries 1 and 2, the price change 
also affects the value of the trade relations between countries 1 and 2 with respect to the bystander, thus 
influencing the total welfare change. 
6 Note that the position of the countries is symmetric relative to one another, that is the transport costs 
between countries 1 and 2 are equal to those between countries 1 and 3 and between 2 and 3. 
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[ ] εεεεεε /1133121211113 −−−−− ++= IYITYITYW  
(8’) δ−= 111 IWw  δ−= 222 IWw  δ−= 333 IWw  
 
The distribution or geography of economic activity in this set-up is be depicted as an 
equilateral triangle, where the share of manufacturing production at the corners 
represents complete agglomeration in one of the countries, see also the discussion of 
Figures 4 and 5 below. The great advantage of the depiction of space in our 3 country 
model as a equilateral triangle is that we can normalize distance and thereby ensure 
symmetry to the extent that transportation costs are the same between any pair of 
countries. Without this assumption the analysis below does not carry through, see also 
Brakman, Garretsen, and Schram (2006) on this issue.    
 
We again investigate the marginal impact of foreign aid A, given by country 1 to 
country 2, around the spreading equilibrium ( 3/1321 === λλλ  and initially 0=A ). 
At this spreading equilibrium equations (5’)-(7’) hold for the following endogenous 
variables: 1321 === WWW , 3/1321 === YYY , and [ ] )1/(11321 3/)21( εε −−+=== TIII . 
We will ignore all second order effects of induced changes, such that: 
21 dYdYdY −== , 21 dWdWdW −== , and similarly for the other variables. 
Differentiating equation (5’) and evaluating at the spreading equilibrium gives 
equation (9’). Similarly, differentiate equation (6’) and evaluate at the spreading 
equilibrium to get equation (10’). 
(9’) dAdWdY −= )3/(δ     33 )3/( dWdY δ=  
(10’) ( ) 31111 331 dWTIdWTIIdI
εεεε −−−−
+−=  3
1
3
3
3
dWI
I
dI −=
ε
   
 
Define )21/()1( 11 εε −− +−≡ TTZ , and note that Z  is an adjusted index of trade 
barriers (for three countries instead of two) which ranges from 0 when there are no 
transport costs (T = 1) to 1 when transport costs are prohibitive ( ∞→T ). With this 
notation we can rewrite equation (10’) at the spreading equilibrium as equation (11’). 
Finally, by using this notation, differentiating equations (7’) and (8’) and evaluating at 
the spreading equilibrium, we arrive at equations (12’) and (13’). 
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(11’) 3
11
3
dWTIdWZ
I
dI εε −−+=    3
1
3
3
3
dWI
I
dI −=
ε
  
(12’) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+−+= −− 3
3
311
3
1)1(3 dY
I
dIIT
I
dIZdYZdW εεε εε  
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−= − 3
3
31
3 3
1 dY
I
dIIdW εε ε  
(13’) 
I
dIdWdwI δδ −=     
3
3
33 I
dIdWdwI δδ −=  
Investigating equations (11’)-(13’) for country 3 quickly reveals that the first order 
effect of the transfer for the bystander is no change at all: 03333 ==== dwdIdYdW . 
This follows because from country 3’s perspective any changes from the spreading 
equilibrium in a particular direction caused by country 1 are exactly compensated by 
opposite changes caused by country 2. Note that this effect would thus not hold if the 
transportation costs from the bystander to the donor would be different from those to 
the recipient. In any case, this symmetry assumption greatly simplifies the subsequent 
analysis for donor and recipient even if a bystander is present. Substituting the 
simplified equations (9’) and (11’) in equation (12’) and collecting terms gives 
equation (14’), determining what happens to the wage rate in country 1. From 
equation (9’), it follows that the income level in country 1 falls and in country 2 rises 
(see equation 15’), while using equation (11’), the price index in country 1 falls and in 
country 2 rises (see equation 16’). Using equations (11’) and (13’) we can nonetheless 
conclude, despite this price index effect, that the real wage rate in country 1 falls and 
in country 2 rises, see equation (17’). Also note that the bystander exacerbates the 
wage rate effect (cp 14 and 14’) but mitigates the income effect (cp. 15 and 15’). 
(14’) 0
)1(
3
2 <−−−
−=
ZZ
Z
dA
dW
εδε    0
3 =
dA
dW  
(15’) 01
3
<−=
dA
dW
dA
dY δ     03 =
dA
dY  
(16’) 0<=
dA
dWZI
dA
dI     03 =
dA
dI  
(17’) 0)1( <−= −
dA
dWZI
dA
dw δδ    03 =
dA
dw  
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Proposition 7 
The impact effects of an infinitesimal transfer of aid in the spreading equilibrium of 
the 3-country core model of geographical economics are: 
 an increase in the wage rate for the recipient, a decrease of the wage rate for the 
donor, and no effect for the bystander (eq. 14’). 
 an increase in the income level for the recipient, a decrease of the income level for 
the donor, and no effect for the bystander (eq. 15’). 
 an increase in the price index level for the recipient, a decrease in the price index 
level for the donor, and no effect for the bystander (eq. 16’) 
 an increase in the real wage rate for the recipient, a decrease in the real wage 
rate for the donor, and no effect for the bystander (eq. 17’) 
 
Lemma 1 
The spreading equilibrium in the 3-country core model of geographical economics is 
locally stable if, and only if, the no-black-hole condition holds ( δρ > ) and the 
transport costs are large enough, more specifically if condition (*) holds. 
(*) 
)(
)1(
)21(
)1(
21
1
ρδ
ρδ
ε
ε
+
+>+
−≡ −
−
T
TZ  
Proof: see appendix II. 
 
Proposition 8 
The dynamic effect of an infinitesimal transfer of aid for a locally stable spreading 
equilibrium of the 3-country core model of geographical economics is: 
 a small influx of manufacturing activity for the recipient, a small reduction of 
manufacturing activity for the donor, and no effect for the bystander. 
 
Proposition 9 
The dynamic effects of an infinitesimal transfer of foreign aid in the spreading 
equilibrium of the 3-country core model of geographical economics are temporary if 
the spreading equilibrium is locally stable (i.e. stopping the flow of foreign aid 
reverses the economy to its original position). 
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So, in contrast to the traditional analysis of infinitesimal or marginal transfers, in our 
NEG setting the bystander has no additional influence on the donor or the recipient as 
compared to the two-country case!  However, by explicitly calculating (numerically) 
discrete, or large, transfers we can easily show that the effects for the bystander can 
be influential in our NEG model. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which shows the 
effects of a discrete transfer on the real wage rate of the bystander as a function of the 
distribution of the mobile labor force in a unit simplex. Figure 4 is a two-dimensional 
representation of the three-country model. If one gets closer to one of the corners this 
means that the country in question produces a larger share of total manufacturing 
output. We can distinguish three different areas in figure 4: an area where the real 
wage increases, an area where it remains the same, and an area where it decreases. 
Figure 4 illustrates, therefore, that the effects of the transfer depend on the initial 
distribution of the footloose workers.  
 
Figure 4 Change in real wage rate of bystander (intermediate transport costs) 
Impact of transfer on bystander real wage rate
falling
equal
rising
centre
country 1
country 2
country 3
rising
falling
equal
 
Parameters: 01.07.1;5;4.0 ==== AandTεδ ; “equal” is relative change smaller than 0.0001. 
 
A closer investigation of Figure 4 reveals that in the area in which the donor (country 
1) and the recipient (country 2) are similar in size (along the perpendicular line from 
the bystander’s (country 3) corner) the effect on the real wage for the bystander is 
zero. If the donor and the bystander are relatively small compared to the recipient (in 
the north-east of the figure) the real wage rate declines, while if the donor and the 
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bystander are relative large compared to the recipient (in the south-west of the figure) 
the real wage increases.  
 
The effects thus depend on whether or not the transfer is substantial for the recipient. 
For a small recipient a given transfer ( 01.0=A ) has a substantial effect on its income 
and real wage. Workers in the bystander country benefit because the ‘extent of 
agglomeration forces’ from the relatively large donor country become smaller, thus 
increasing the relative attractiveness for the bystander (note: the real wage rate always 
increases for the recipient and falls for the donor in Figure 4). Analogous reasoning 
holds for the north-east part of the figure, resulting in a decrease of the real wage rate 
for the bystander. This leads to the interesting conclusion that if aid is given to a 
particular recipient, other developing countries are also affected. Since we can safely 
assume that the income level of the donor is usually large compared to that of 
developing countries, Figure 4 indicates that the non-targeted bystander country 
usually benefits.  
 
Figure 5 Change in real wage rate of bystander (high transport costs)  
Impact of transfer on bystander real wage rate
falling
equal
rising
centre
country 1
country 2
country 3
rising
rising
falling
falling
equal
 
Parameters: 01.02;5;4.0 ==== AandTεδ ; “equal” is relative change smaller than 0.0001. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates a similar exercise as Figure 4, but now for a higher level of 
transport costs ( 2=T  instead of 7.1=T ). Relative to Figure 4 two new areas appear 
in the north-western part of Figure 5. These new areas reflect the fact that for 
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sufficiently high transport costs a transfer from a donor to a recipient that is similar in 
size reduces the attractiveness (real wage in the donor), making both re-location to the 
recipient country and the bystander country more attractive, thus also increasing the 
bystander’s real wage rate. 
 
Note finally that when one starts from a spreading equilibrium in Figure 5 (the 
triangle ∆ in the middle of the Figure), the real wage for the donor falls, increases for 
recipient and remains the same for the bystander (recall proposition 7). In this case the 
1st order dynamic effect in terms of Figure 5 is a move in the north-eastern direction 
which leads the economy to the area where the real wage for the bystander falls. The 
2nd order dynamic effect after reallocation when we start from the spreading 
equilibrium is thus negative for the bystander.     
 
4.  Conclusions 
Traditionally the analysis of the economics of international transfers is based on 
models characterized by perfect competition where the location of economic activity 
is not an issue. It is, however, a stylized fact that economic activity is distributed 
unevenly across space, which calls for an analysis of the effects of transfers or aid 
using models where location matters and where, consequently, imperfect competition 
rules. It is for this reason that we think that new economic geography (NEG) models 
can be useful for the analysis of international transfers. 
 
Using the working horse model of the NEG literature due to Krugman (1991), this 
chapter provides such an analysis. We first analyze the effects of a transfer in a two-
country world, and subsequently extend the analysis with a bystander country. In the 
standard literature on international transfers the presence of a bystander is essential 
for transfer paradoxes to arise. Our main findings can be summarized as follows. 
First, transfer paradoxes are not possible even if bystanders are present. Second, the 
effects of foreign aid depend on the level of economic integration between donor and 
recipient. Third, if the equilibrium from which aid is given is stable, aid only has a 
temporary effect (even if a bystander is present). Fourth, if the donor is relatively 
large, not only the recipient but also the bystander benefits from foreign aid.  
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Appendix I, The core NEG model (Krugman, 1991) 
Demand 
Assume an economy with two sectors, a numéraire sector (H), and a Manufacturing 
(M) sector. As a short cut one often refers to H as the agricultural sector to indicate 
that this industry is tied to a specific location. Every consumer in the economy shares 
the same, Cobb-Douglas, preferences for both types of commodities: 
)1( δδ −= HMU  
The parameter δ is the share of income spent on manufactured goods. M is a CES 
sub-utility function of many varieties. 
 
ρ
ρ
/1
1
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∑
=
n
i
icM  
Maximizing the sub-utility subject to the relevant income constraint, that is the part of 
income that is spent on manufactures, δY, gives the demand for each variety, j: 
 YIpc jj δεε 1−−= ,  
in which ∑ −−=
i
ipI
)1/(1)1( ])([ εε is the CES-price index for manufactures, ε = ρ−1
1  the 
elasticity of substitution, and Y= income.  
 
Manufacturing Supply 
Next, turn to the supply side. Each variety, i, is produced according to the following 
cost function, )( ixC : 
 )()( iii xWxC βα +=  
where the coefficients α and β describe, the fixed and marginal input requirement per 
variety. Maximizing profits gives the familiar mark-up pricing rule: 
 βε Wpi =− )
11( ,  
Using the zero profit condition, )( iii xWxp βα += , and the mark-up pricing rule, 
gives the break- even supply of a variety i (each variety is produced by a single firm): 
 β
εα )1( −=ix = x* 
 
Labour Market 
There is only one factor of production, Labour, L (which can be normalized to 1). The 
total amount of labour is given and fixed. Initially, the labour force is distributed over 
Manufacturing (a share δ of L), and the numéraire sector (a share (1- δ) of L). Labour 
in the manufacturing sector is mobile over countries. The distribution of δL over 
countries, r, is represented by the share λr of δL, the distribution of the immobile labor 
force is represented by a share φr of (1- δ)L. 
 
Equilibrium with transport costs  
Furthermore, transportation of manufactures is costly. Transportation costs T are so-
called iceberg transportation costs: T12>1 units of the manufacturing good have to be 
shipped from country 1 to country 2 for one unit of the good to actually arrive in 
country 2. Assume, for illustration purposes, that the two countries - 1 and 2 - are the 
only countries. Total demand for a product from, for example country 1, now comes 
from two countries, 1 and 2. The consumers and firms in country 2 have to pay 
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transportation costs on their imports. This leads to the following total demand for a 
variety produced in country 1: 
1
21212
1
1111 )(
−−−−− += εεεεε ITpYIpYx  
We already know that the break-even supply equals β
εα )1(
1
−=x , equating this to 
total demand gives (note that the demand from country 2 is multiplied by T12 in order 
to compensate for the part that melts away during transportation): 
1
2
1
1212
1
111 )(
)1( −−−−− +=− εεεεεβ
εα ITpYIpY   
Inserting the mark-up pricing rule in this last equation and solving for the wage rate 
gives the two-country version of the wage equation.7 The wage equation for the 2 
country case can be stated as: 
εεεε 11
2
1
122
1
111 ))((
−−− += ITYIYConstW ,  
where the constant, Const, is a function of (fixed) model parameters. Similarly, for the 
n country ( rn ,..,1= ) case we arrive at the following equilibrium wage equation, and 
this is the wage equation (3) that is used in the main text of the paper: 
 ( )[ ] εεε 111 −−∑= rsss sr TIYConstW  
Wr is the country’s r (nominal) wage rate, Ys is expenditures (demand for final 
consumption), Is is the price index for manufactured goods, ε is the elasticity of 
substitution for manufactured goods and Trs are the iceberg transport costs between 
countries r and s. With interregional labour mobility a long run equilibrium is reached 
interregional real wages are equalized, where the real wage is defined as wr=Wr( Is)-δ. 
(See for more details Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 1999 (ch. 4 and 5) or Brakman, 
Garretsen and Van Marrewijk, 2001 (ch. 3 and 4).    
 
Appendix II  Stability around the spreading equilibrium in the 3-country model 
We investigate the marginal impact of a movement of manufacturing workers from 
country 1 to country 2 around the spreading equilibrium ( 3/1321 === λλλ  and 
0=A ). Note that at this spreading equilibrium equations (5’)-(7’) hold for the 
following endogenous variables: 1321 === WWW ,  3/1321 === YYY , and [ ] )1/(11321 3/)21( εε −−+=== TIII . We will ignore all second order effects of induced 
changes, such that we can write 21 dYdYdY −== , 21 dWdWdW −== , and similarly 
for the other variables. Differentiating equation (1’) and evaluating at the spreading 
equilibrium gives equation (A1). Similarly, differentiate equation (2’) and evaluate at 
the spreading equilibrium to get equation (A2). 
(A1) dWddY )3/(δλδ +=     33 )3/( dWdY δ=  
(A2) ( ) 31111 3)1(311)1( dWTIddWTIIdI
εε
εε ελεε
−−
−− −+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−−=−
 3
1
3
3
3
dWI
I
dI −=
ε
  
                                                 
7 The reason to derive a wage equation instead of a traditional equilibrium price equation is that labour 
migration between countries is a function of (real) wages.  
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Define )21/()1( 11 εε −− +−≡ TTZ , and note that Z  is an adjusted index of trade 
barriers (for three countries instead of two) which ranges from 0 when there are no 
transport costs (T = 1) to 1 when transport costs are prohibitive ( ∞→T ). With this 
notation we can rewrite equation (A2) at the spreading equilibrium as equation (A3). 
Finally, using this notation, differentiating equations (3’) and (4’) and evaluating at 
the spreading equilibrium gives equations (A4) and (A5). 
(A3) 3
11
31
3 dWTIdWZdZ
I
dI εελε
−−
++−=   3
1
3
3
3
dWI
I
dI −=
ε
  
(A4) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+−+= −− 3
3
311
3
1)1(3 dY
I
dIIT
I
dIZdYZdW εεε εε  
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−= − 3
3
31
3 3
1 dY
I
dIIdW εε ε  
(A5) 
I
dIdWdwI δδ −=   
3
3
33 I
dIdWdwI δδ −=  
Investigating the equations for country 3 reveals that the first order effect of the 
migration flow is no change at all: 03333 ==== dwdIdYdW . This follows because 
from country 3’s perspective any change from the spreading equilibrium caused by 
country 1 are exactly compensated by opposite changes caused by country 2. Note 
that this effect only hold if the transportation costs from the bystander to the donor are 
the same as those to the recipient which greatly simplifies the subsequent analysis for 
countries 1 and 2 as: 
(A3’) dWZdZ
I
dI +−= λε1
3     
(A4’) 
I
dIZdYZdW )1(3 −+= εε  
Substituting (A1) in (A4’) and combining with (A5’) gives 
(A6) λεδ
ε
εδε dZ
Z
dW
IdI
ZZ
Z ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−
−
)1/(3
)1/(3/
)1/()(
1
 
(A7) λεδ
εεδε
d
Z
Z
Z
ZZ
dW
IdI ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−−
∆=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
)1/(3
)1/(3
1
)1/()(1/  
where ( ) )1/()1( 2 εεδε −+−−≡∆ ZZ , such that  
)1(
)1(
3
2 Z
Zd
I
dI δε
ελ −−∆=   )()1(
3 ZZddW −−∆= δε
λ  
Finally, substituting in (A5) gives the change in the real wage 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−−
+−+−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−−
−+−−
−=
−−
2
2
2
2
)1(1
)()1()1(3
)1(
]1)1([)12(
)1(
3
ZZ
ZIZ
ZZ
ZIZ
d
dw
ρρδ
ρδρδ
ρ
ρ
εδε
δεεδ
ελ
δδ
 The 
second equality follows from the definition of ρ. The sign of the real wage change is 
then determined by the sign of the numerator of the expression in square brackets, 
which gives the expression in the text.  
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